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“The Wall was Too High”: the Four
Predicaments of Mr Miliband
L’obstacle était trop grand : les 4 difficultés de Monsieur Miliband
Eric Shaw
“Hey you, don’t help them to bury the light
Don’t give in without a fight……
But it was only fantasy.
The wall was too high, 
As you can see.
No matter how he tried, 
He could not break free……
Pink Floyd “Hey You” in The Wall 
1 The 2015 elections  inflicted a  devastating defeat  on the  Labour  party.  Until  the  last
moment polls indicated that a minority Labour government backed by the SNP would
scrape though. In the event, the Tories gained an absolute majority, the first time since
1992 in a result no one had anticipated. Ed Miliband immediately resigned and the search
for a successor has begun.
Party Percentage Gain/loss Seats
Conservative 36.9 +0.8 331
Labour 30.4 +1.5 232
UKIP 12.6 +9.5 1
Liberal Democrat 7.9 -15.2 8
Scottish National Party 4.7 +3.1 56
Green 3.8 +2.8 1
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Others (Mainly in Northern Ireland)   23
2 Source BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015/results
3 Let me begin by explaining what this paper is not about: it is not an analysis of why
Labour suffered such a devastating election defeat, nor does it seek to explore its election
campaign strategy in any detail.  It also ignores the crucial aspect of Scotland, where,
crushed by the SNP, Labour lost all but one of its 41 seats: in effect this was a separate
election.1 
4 The issue the paper explores is why Labour was never likely to succeed. 2 And it does so by
probing four major predicaments: lack of confidence in Ed Miliband as a potential Prime
Minister, in Labour’s ability to run the economy, in its capacity to manage the explosive
issue of immigration and in its will to tackle (alleged) pervasive welfare abuse. 
5 The first section of the paper consists of a detailed examination of these predicaments
and evaluates Labour’s efforts to resolve or mitigate them. The second section consider
whether, as many commentators alleged, that Labour lost because it failed to come to
terms with “reality”, that is was out of tune with public opinion on the issues of the
economy, immigration and welfare (see, e.g., Philpott, 2015). This article paper argues
that “reality” is a rather more ambiguous concept than this argument allows, and that the
“reality” which Labour failed to recognise was a constructed reality. The paper uses the
metaphor of the dwellers in Plato’s Cave to illustrate the fact that the subjective mental
universe of many voters was at variance with empirically verifiable facts. The paper then
uses  concepts  from social  psychology  to  scrutinise  the  rather  different  ways  people
apprehend social realties.
6 If many (though not all) voters inhabited Plato’s Cave should it follow that, as senior
Labour  frontbenchers,  Chuka  Umunna,  maintained,  Labour  “must  start  by  meeting  the
voters where they are, not where we would like them to be”? (Guardian 29 June 2015). Or would
this failure by the party to affirm its own values simply, as former prominent Labour MP
Bryan Gould riposted, lead voters to conclude that Labour was “fatally short of both courage
and convictions”? (Guardian 21 July 2015). The third section of this article contends that
political parties do have the capacity to modify mass perceptions but only be devising a
plausible narrative, that alter the way people construe key salient societal issues. This the
party failed to do, disabling its capacity to tackle any of its four predicaments. The paper
concludes with some brief reflections on the party past and present. 
 
Labour’s four predicaments (1) The problem of
leadership
7 We now live in an age when fixed party loyalties and class allegiances have faded and
where voting is no longer an expressive act but a conscious decision. But how is that
decision made? Rational choice theory, deriving from the work of Anthony Downs, sees
voters as rational calculators or “utility maximizers” driven by self-interest. Scrutinising
party  programmes  and  ideology,  they  decide  which  party  is  closest  to  them in  the
political spectrum and which policies coincide most closely to their own preferences and
will therefore maximize their “utility”.3 
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8 This  approach  makes  quite  implausible  assumptions  about  voter  willingness  to  seek
information and undertake sustained cognitive activity.  Valence theory takes a more
realistic  approach.  It  argues  that,  rather  than  engaging  in  a  time-consuming  and
demanding process of learning about party policies voters rely on simplifying “heuristic
devices” or shortcuts. Research in the UK has shown the two principal such devices are
evaluations of party leadership and economic competence.4 The section will focus on the
first of these, the next section on the second. 
9 Why is leadership so important? Unlike issues and policies, which are complex and often
abstract, party leaders are highly visible embodiments of their parties.5 The greater the
confidence voters repose in a leader, then the more trust they will place in the capacity of
the leader’s party to “deliver the goods”. Conversely, lack of faith in a leader undermines
faith in the party. Three attributes of leadership are of particular relevance here: 
10 The  possession  of  the  qualities  seen  as  required  to  be  an  effective  Prime  Minister;
communicative  ability,  that  is  the  ability  to  persuade people  of  the  validity  of  their
message; Affinity, or the possession of a personality which people find attractive and
appealing. 
11 Miliband’s predicament was that he, very consistently, scored poorly on all three counts.
Whilst Cameron conveyed a sense of being competent, decisive, self-assured and willing
to take tough decisions (all major prime ministerial qualities) Miliband was seen as weak,
irresolute and ineffectual.6
12 A  party’s  capacity  to  communicate  its  message  effectively  relies  heavily  on  the
performance skills of its leader, especially on television. Unlike Tony Blair, Miliband was
neither a polished televisual performer, with his delivery too often stilted and wooden,
nor a telegenic personality.7 According to John McTernan, formerly a senior aide to Tony
Blair, “the Labour leader is compelling in private; empathetic, intelligent and charming. Yet this
does not come across in all his public performances – in particular, it does not survive the journey
through  the  camera  lens  and  into  the  living  room”  (John  McTernan,  Financial  Times 24
September 2014). 
13 But it was on people’s judgment of his personality that Miliband trailed most heavily
behind David Cameron. This judgment is more affective than reasoned; a matter of how
people feel about leaders, whether they like or dislike them, whether or not they find
them congenial and attractive. Miliband’s public image was an extraordinarily negative
one. He was widely seen as odd, pathetic, “geeky”, and “uncharismatic”, a man who had “
stabbed his brother in the back”. The character trait most often used to describe him was “
weird.” The sheer intensity of this hostility, sometimes verging on loathing, is striking
and, doubtless influenced by the unremittingly scathing coverage meted out to him by
the right-wing tabloids.  The virulence of  the  Murdoch press  indeed intensified after
Miliband’s decision (bravely and against the advice of a number of senior frontbenchers8)
to  challenge  News  International  over  the  phone  hacking-scandal.  An  avalanche  of
vitriolic personal denunciation was the inevitable result.9
14 Miliband’s capacity to place a firmer stamp of authority was sapped by the narrowness of
his  majority  over  his  brother,  by  his  poor  personal  ratings  and  by  relentlessly
unflattering, but off-the record, briefings by many of his colleagues who portrayed him as
arrogant, aloof and indecisive.10 All this was demoralising and, not surprisingly, Steve
Richards of the Independent reported “a mood of paranoia and suspicion” around him.11 
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15 When  the  campaign  commenced,  perceptions  became  less  negative  as  Miliband  was
exposed to more voters and performed better than anticipated on TV interviews. But it
was too little, too late.12 Well before the election campaign, Miliband’s media-propelled
caricatured image had congealed in the public eye to form a gestalt through which all
information was filtered and this proved impossible to dislodge. A party’s leader should
operate as its most effective exponent: for Labour, Miliband was a hindrance and this first
predicament was never overcome.
 
Labour’s four predicaments (2) the problem of
economic credibility
16 If leadership quality, according to valence theory, is the first heuristic to simplify voting
choice,  the  second  is  evaluation  of  economic  competence.  Which  of  the  two  major
contenders for government office is most capable of managing the economy and hence
delivering  improved  living  standards,  jobs  and  stable  prices?  13 Labour’s  second
predicament  was that  voters  consistently  preferred the Conservatives  and by a  wide
margin with, for example, with much greater confidence in George Osborne than in Ed
Balls as a Chancellor of the Exchequer.14 
17 It rapidly became evident that poor economic ratings was a major problem for Labour:
the question was how to address it. Here there were differences over two main issues,
broad economic strategy and fiscal  policy,  between three strands of  opinion :  (1)  Ed
Miliband and his closest advisers, (2) the Blairite/right-wing of the party, including the
senior frontbencher and elections co-ordinator, Douglas Alexander and (3) the Shadow
Chancellor, Ed Balls. 
18 Miliband’s analysis, in brief, was as follows: Labour had forfeited the voters” confidence
because  it  was  associated  with  a  flawed  economic  model  inherited  from  and  in  its
essentials  preserved by the Blair/Brown Governments.  Under this  free market model
economic activity was skewed by an inflated and inadequately regulated financial sector
prone to speculative activity – which was why the UK had suffered so severely from the
financial crash. This was coupled with a low-skill, low-wage growth model characterised
by insecure and precarious work that stifled productivity and growth, and exacerbated
labour  exploitation.  Whilst  growth  did  revive  in  2013  it  was  unstable  because  wage
stagnation depressed demand causing heavy reliance on high private debt  and a  re-
ignited housing bubble. The outcome was, in an oft-repeated sound-bite, a “cost of living
crisis in which rewards from higher growth accrued primarily to a privileged few whilst living
standards for most others, the ‘squeezed middle’ as well as the poor, languished.” 15 This was the
system of “predatory capitalism”. 
19 Miliband’s initial prescription for restoring Labour’s standing on the economy, unveiled
in his 2011 Conference speech, was to call for a radical reform of the British economic
model by replacing “predatory capitalism”, with its “cosy cartels” and “vested interests” with
“responsible capitalism”. “Responsible capitalism”, based on the German model of “concerted
capitalism”, would be characterised by more sustained investment, a more highly-skilled
workforce,  firmer  regulation  and  a  more  equitable  pattern  of  distribution.16 The
transition to “responsible capitalism” would be effected through the reconfiguring of the
institutional interface between finance, industry and labour including such institutions as
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a state investment bank to foster long-term lending, enhanced vocational training and
major infrastructure investment. 
20 How realistic this move to a more socially-regulated form of concerted capitalism was is a
moot  point  since  theorists  of  “varieties  of  capitalism”  argue  that  problems  of  “path
dependency” greatly complicate the task of shifting from one “variety” to another. But, for
Miliband, an additional problem was that many influential voices in the party did not
even believe the effort was worthwhile. Shortly after his conference address assailing “
predatory capitalism” Lib Dem Business Secretary Vince Cable texted Labour’s leader to
commend him for “the most important social democratic speech for forty years”. 17 Many of
Miliband’s senior colleagues, including Ed Balls, Douglas Alexander, Jim Murphy (then
Shadow Defence  Secretary)  and  Shadow Business  Secretary  Chukka  Umunna  sharply
disagreed. For such politicians securing the support of big business was a key to the
success of New Labour and the language of “corporate greed and ‘predatory capitalism’” - as
well as the call for a new 50% income tax band for the very wealthy - heedlessly put this
at risk.18 They rapidly communicated their reservations to Miliband.
21 Miliband,  it  seems,  had not  anticipated so negative a  response and the concept  of  “
predatory capitalism” was soon abandoned. Instead, he shifted towards a more cautious
strategy,  one  designed  to  rebuild  Labour’s  economic  credibility  by  formulating  and
highlighting a series  of  tangible policies  that  focus groups indicated would galvanise
public opinion. These included a freeze on energy prices, the reintroduction of the 50%
tax rate (for those earning over £150,000), an increase in the minimum wage, a restored
10% tax band on low income-earners, the so-called “Mansion Tax” on houses worth more
than £2m and a one-off tax on bankers” bonuses. Whilst some of these policies overlapped
with  those  contained  in the  “responsible  capitalism”  approach  they  took  the  form of
discrete  pledges  rather  than  integrated  elements  of  an  alternative,  overarching
programme.
22 In  fact,  such  broader  economic  matters  were  increasingly  overshadowed  by  more
immediately  contentious  issues  of  fiscal  policy.  From the inception of  his  leadership
Miliband was faced with the allegation that Labour’s reckless over-spending had caused
the financial crash. For many on the party’s right (though not for Miliband and Balls)
there was some validity in these charges. Impatient with Miliband and Balls” refusal to
accept this they wanted a much tighter fiscal stance. A willingness to take a tough line on
spending  was,  they  asserted,  “fundamental  to  being regarded  as  a  credible  alternative
government”.19
23 Under pressure, Miliband and Balls eventually agreed to shift towards a more astringent
fiscal  stance.  Thus  a  future  Labour  government  would  acquiesce  in  many  of  the
Coalition’s cuts, adhere to its spending plans for the first year in office, impose a cap on
most welfare spending and agree to more means-testing of benefits. 20 But the two men
were equally keen to retain room for manoeuver. Thus whilst they pledged to eliminate
the current budget deficit – the gap between tax revenues and day-to-day spending –
within the next  parliamentary term,  they rejected the much tighter Tory goal  of  an
overall budgetary surplus, promising to proceed more slowly on deficit reduction and to
rely more on higher taxes. 21 Disputing claims (from the left) that the two main parties
had converged, the Institute of Fiscal Studies reported that Tory policies required a “
colossal”  reduction in  public  spending whilst  Labour’s  did  not.  As  a  result,  the  IFS”s
deputy director Carl Emmerson concluded that the choice over tax and spending was
starker than at any general election since 1992.22
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24 As the party moved into the election campaign, it struck was a balance between left-
leaning populism and fiscal caution. The former was epitomised by Miliband’s call for the
“irresponsible rich” to bear a larger share of the burden of compressing the deficit through higher
taxes 23 and tough measures to curb “industrial scale tax avoidance.” 24 But equal attention was
given to asserting Labour’s “fiscal responsibility.” Thus the manifesto promised that no
additional spending would be financed by borrowing (although Labour would borrow to
fund  infrastructure  projects,  a  major  difference  from  the  Tory  plans);  cuts  would
continue until  the deficit  was eliminated;  borrowing and the national  debt would be
progressively reduced and a surplus delivered on the current budget “as soon as possible in
the next parliament”.25
25 Neither arm of the strategy had much effect as Labour continued to lag well behind on
economic competence.  Polls  regularly found that the majority of  voters accepted the
Coalition’s  story  that  Labour  had  caused  the  financial  crisis, that  tough  austerity
measures were a vital for the economy and that a government led by Miliband and Balls
would ruin the nation’s finances. 26 This second predicament, like the first, was never
resolved. 
 
Labour’s four predicaments (3) the problem of
immigration
26 Voters have always preferred the Conservatives over Labour as being “tougher” on the
issue of immigration. Labour’s vulnerability on the issue intensified as the salience of the
issue  mounted  with  a  rapid  expansion  in  immigration  accompanied  by  hardening
attitudes towards immigrants.27 In one extensive survey, Lord Ashcroft found that 60%
thought immigration had a negative impact on the country with many believing that
immigrants took jobs away from British workers, were claiming too many benefits, were
lowering wages and were putting an unfair burden on hospitals and schools. 28 Amongst
voters who backed Labour in 2005, those who were most worried about immigration were
most likely to desert the party in 2010. 29 After 2010, immigration was perceived as one of
the three key problems (along with the economy and the NHS) confronting the country.
Labour’s problem was that many believed that the interests of immigrants and the native
population were in conflict with each other, it that it placed the interests of the former
first.30 The more heated the public debate over immigration, the more opinion (especially
working class opinion) was alienated from Labour. This was Miliband’s third predicament.
27 The remarkable rise of UKIP – which triumphed as the largest party in the 2014 European
elections – was the principal expression of the upsurge in the political prominence of
immigration.  Initially,  there  were  hopes  amongst  Labour  strategists  that  this  would
benefit the party by splitting the right-wing vote, but it soon became evident that UKIP
was making deep inroads into Labour’s own working class base. For example, between
2005 and 2013, Labour’s support among white working-class pensioners collapsed from
45% to 26% whilst UKIP support leapt from 3% to 28%. 31
28 The  party  was  uncertain  how  to  respond  to  which  was,  in  truth,  an  intractable
predicament,  oscillating from one approach to another.  Thus,  in his  2010 acceptance
speech Miliband conceded the previous government had ignored rising anxieties about
immigration and reassured voters that he understood their “frustration […] that we didn’t
seem to be on your side.”32 Initially, he construed the problem of immigration as primarily
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one of  a  defective,  malfunctioning labour market.  Cheap labour was being sucked in
because  employers  were  competing  on  price  rather  than  quality,  and  rather  than
investing were expanding low-paid jobs at pay rates many British people were reluctant
to accept. His remedy was to strengthen labour protection, tighten regulations governing
working conditions and inhibit employers from undercutting wages through imported
labour. 33 The cultural sources of anti-immigrant feeling, especially significant in areas of
high  Muslim population,  were  more  or  less  ignored.  It  soon  became  apparent  that,
whatever its merits, this initial approach was not assuaging voter insecurities and not
arresting defections from Labour. 
29 With  anxiety mounting  over  its  vulnerability  on  the  issue,  the  party  switched  tack
pledging to be “tough” on immigration. The manifesto combined elements of the two
approaches  coupling  labour  market  reforms  with  promises  to  reduce  low-skilled
immigration from outside the EU, prevent EU migrants from claiming benefits for at least
two years (and from claiming child benefit for children living outside the UK) and
stronger action to stop illegal immigration.34 However, this new approach appeared to be
no  more  effective.  According  to  the  polling  agency  Survation,  immigration  was
responsible for the loss of many votes to UKIP and this contributed directly to Labour’s
failure to win marginal seats in the North and the Midlands. 35 
30 In truth there was no easy solution to Labour’s predicament on immigration since the
party’s  liberal  values  were  so  incongruent  with  popular  sentiment.  Miliband
acknowledged that the previous government had tended to ignore the impact of migrant
labour on wage levels, especially amongst the low paid, though he tended to skirt the
impact on social cohesion as the native population struggled to adapt to the heavy influx
of immigrants, many with different cultures, customs, languages and values. But however
much the party hardened its stance it could never outbid UKIP and the Tories. The plain
fact was, as an influential Labour blogger commented, that “immigration is one of those
issues on which it’s hard-wired into the public imagination that we are ‘soft’. And no amount of
tough-talking rhetoric […] has helped our case a jot.” 36 Miliband had anticipated that having
an informed and candid debate on immigration would be an “incredibly  hard thing to
achieve”.  37 In  practice,  impossible  –  rendering  the  third  predicament  impossible  to
resolve. 
 
Labour’s four predicaments (4) the problem of “welfare
cheats”
31 The brunt of the Coalition’s spending axe fell on those reliant on welfare benefit, the
unemployed, the sick, the disabled and the low-waged. But this did not alienate popular
support. To the contrary: the cuts have been popular, with YouGov polling finding that
about 60%-65% believed government welfare reductions were about right or were not
deep enough. 38 A British Social Attitudes Survey in 2014 revealed that less than a third of
the population felt that the government should spend more on welfare, a sharp reduction
from previous years. 39 It was Labour’s natural instinct to defend the most vulnerable
members  of  society  from severe  benefit  reductions,  but  this  merely  fed  the  popular
perception that it was “soft on welfare spongers”. This was Miliband’s fourth predicament.
32 Research has shown that whether or not people approve of benefits is contingent upon
whether the groups that receive them are seen to be “deserving.” Notions of desert are, in
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turn, heavily influenced by how the problem which social benefits are meant to tackle is
framed.  Framing involves  selecting,  highlighting and presenting aspects  of  perceived
reality in a way that privileges a particular diagnosis of the problem, invokes a moral
evaluation, and prescribes a remedy. 40 The key distinction here is between individualistic
and societal frames: whether problems such as poverty and unemployment are construed
as  the  responsibility  of  the  poor  and  unemployment  themselves  (the  individualistic
frame)  are  as  the  result  of  social  factors  (the  societal  frame).  Survey  evidence  has
chronicled the growing popularity of the former at the expense of the latter. For example,
a majority of voters evidently believe that poverty is a lifestyle choice rather than the
result of social and economic conditions 41 and 59% feel that “most unemployed people could
find a job if they really wanted one” (the figure for 1993 was 27%). 42 Research has found that
a  very  large  proportion  of  people  are  convinced  that  social  security  “sponging”  and
welfare  fraud  are  ubiquitous  and  that  the  excessive  generosity  of  benefits  causes  “
dependency”  and  discourages  the  search  for  work.  43 This  obsession  with  “ welfare
scrounging” - that is the receipt of benefits by those who do not deserve them – has been
fuelled by media (especially tabloid) reporting which imputes the plight of the poor to
their own fecklessness, irresponsibility and anti-social behaviour. 44 Not surprisingly the
Tory  rhetoric  of  “strivers  versus  skivers”  caught  the  mood of  the  nation with  Labour
depicted as a “soft touch” for “welfare cheats” and the pampered “workshy”. 45 When focus
groups were asked who they thought Labour represented, one of the stock images was of
“a slob lounging at home on his sofa.” 46 As a result very large numbers of voters identified
Labour as the party not of “ordinary, hard-working” families but of benefit claimants. 47
Ever since the Thatcher years Tory strategy had been to drive a wedge through Labour’s
social base by exploiting, sharpening and amplifying existing divisions between those in
work  and  the  poor,  welfare  recipients  and  immigrants.  As  long  ago  as  1989  one
commentator had noted how adept Thatcherism was at negative stereotyping. It was “
superb at parcelling people up as outsiders, malcontents or morally undeserving ‘scroungers’”. 48 
Endlessly reinforced and magnified by the Conservatives and the right-wing press (and
increasingly, by television) 49 such ideas had entrenched themselves in the public psyche,
and  the  “hard-working  families”  vs.  the  undeserving  poor  cleavage  has  increasingly
displaced traditional notions of class identity.
33 How was the party to respond? Again, there was uncertainty and equivocation in Labour’s
upper echelons. The right of the party was clearer in its strategy. “Transfixed by dire polls
showing voters see them as soft on welfare” 50 they pressed for a more robust line on welfare:
in the words of frontbencher Liam Byrne to “get tough on those who are consistently shown to
be  shirking  their  responsibilities”;51 or,  as  his  successor  as  Work and Pensions  Shadow,
Rachel Reeves, declared to show that “we are not the party for people on benefits” and would
be “tougher than the Tories”.52 However Miliband knew that matching the Tories” rhetoric
would be impossible, would inflame opinion in the party and would simply give grater
coherence to the myth of mass welfare fraud. But he was caught in a dilemma, as the
Tories well knew. By criticising the Tories” “cruel and unfeeling” cuts, Labour rendered
itself “vulnerable to being portrayed as defending the interests of  a dodgy,  workshy minority
against the decent, hardworking majority”.53 On the other hand, if it backed Tory measures it
would anger its own members, subvert its core values and probably have little to show for
it. The point about predicaments is they cannot easily be escaped and on this, the fourth
predicament, Labour did not.
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In Plato’s Cave
Imagine human beings living in an underground den which is open towards the
light; they have been there from childhood [….] and can only see into the den. At a
distance there is a fire, and between the fire and the prisoners a raised way, and a
low wall is built along the way, like the screen over which marionette players show
their  puppets.  Behind the wall  appear moving figures,  who hold in their  hands
various works of art, and among them images of men and animals, wood and stone,
and some of the passers-by are talking and others silent. … They are ourselves and
they see only the shadows of the images which the fire throws on the wall of the
den; to these they give names. (Plato, The Republic). 
34 So far, we have charted public attitudes on a range of issues – on Miliband’s leadership,
on  the  economy,  immigration  and  welfare  benefits.  For  most  politicians  and  many
commentators the extent to which these attitudes corresponded to a verifiable reality is
not an issue of any real importance. Rational choice theory takes it as axiomatic that
voters  act  as  informed  rational  decision-makers  whilst  valence  theorists  seem
uninterested in how voters  use heuristics  to make evaluations.  Equally,  it  was not  a
matter that interested the bulk of Labour politicians.
35 The point of departure in this paper is rather different. Its hypothesis is that the gap
between perception and reality is, for many, wide with the majority of voters having at
best a desultory interest in politics, a meagre awareness of the issues and little appetite to
find out more. These voters – this paper suggests – are the dwellers in Plato’s cave who
see reality  not  as  it  might  present  itself  to  the informed observer  but  through “the
shadows of the images which the fire throws on the wall of the den”. 
36 This may seem a sweeping statement so let us inspect some of the research evidence.
Take, for example, the issue of immigration. An Ipsos MORI poll reported that the public’s
average estimate of the proportion of the UK population that is foreign-born was 31 per
cent: the official estimate is of around 13 per cent. 54 Similarly YouGov research reported
that respondents exaggerated the proportion of immigrants on any sort of benefit by a
factor of over 7. 55 Most people believe that immigrants are a huge burden on the state. In
fact  between  2001  and  2011  overall  immigration  to  the  UK  made  a  positive  net
contribution  of  about  £25billion.  “Rather  than  being  a  drain  on  the  UK’s  fiscal system”
Dustmann  and  Frattini,  two  leading  experts  on  migration  economics  concluded,  “
immigrants arriving since the early 2000s have made substantial net contributions to its public
finances, a reality that contrasts starkly with the view often maintained in public debate.” 56 Other
research has found that the widespread belief that immigrants have “taken our jobs” and
seriously depressed wage levels is incorrect. 57 In summary, perceptions of the impact of
immigration bear “little relationship to objective assessments” with people in general having
“a very poor understanding of the scale and nature of immigration”.58
37 The same pattern unfolds on the question of welfare benefits. A survey found that on
average  people  believed  that  the  percentage  of  the  welfare  budget  spent  on  the
unemployed people was 41%. The actual figure was 3%. They believed that 27% of the
welfare  budget  was  claimed  fraudulently:  the  real  figure  (according  to  Government
statistics) was 0.7%. 59 A report commissioned by an alliance of British churches found
that the perception of the majority of the population that poverty was largely due to
sloth, irresponsibility and addiction to drink and drugs, had no basis at all in empirical
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evidence. The ease with which social benefits could be accessed and their generosity were
both grossly exaggerated (See table below). 60
Source: Independent 4 January 2013. 
38 It does not follow from this that all public opinion is equally poorly-informed: in fact
research consistently shows that minorities of voters are well-informed. To explain and
conceptualise the difference between the two, we need to understand the psychological
mechanisms through which people process  political  information.  Social  psychological
research has found that faced by a mass of data people act as “cognitive misers” who
economise “as much as they can on the effort they need to expend when processing information.”
61 They do so by relying on “cognitive shortcuts”, or “schemas”. Schemas are sets of pre-
existing beliefs, preconceptions and expectations about a particular issue, group or event
which help “guide what we attend to, what we perceive and what we infer...a kind of mental
short-hand.” 62
39 However, schemas can vary widely in nature, quality and intellectual rigour. Though it is
commonly assumed that people absorb messages and formulate opinions in more or less
the same way, research has consistently shown that this is not the case. People differ
considerably in their reasoning capacity, their use and application of concepts and in the
contextual  knowledge  they  have  at  their  disposal.63 For  example,  research  into  how
people consume the news uncovered “pronounced differences in the extent to which news is
remembered and understood by difference sections of the audience.” 64 The key variable here is
education. Higher levels of education, as one would expect, provide people with greater
ability to process and more motivation to search out information as well as more skill in
assessing it by manipulating concepts. 65 
40 Petty and Cacioppo have sought to conceptualise the operations of differing schemas
through their Elaboration Likelihood model. Elaboration refers to the extent to which a
person “scrutinises the issue-relevant arguments contained in the persuasive communication”
with the propensity to do so a function of “a person’s motivation and ability to evaluate the
communication  presented.”  66 They  distinguish  here  between  two  distinct  modes  of
response to communications, the “central” and “peripheral.” The “central” mode takes the
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form of a considered and thoughtful examination of the arguments and evidence. Those
who  follow  the  “peripheral  route”,  in  contrast,  respond  less  to  the  substance  of  the
message than to “some simple cue in the persuasion context”, e.g., an attractive or appealing
source. 67 
41 The assumption made by most analysts, journalists and pollsters is that the bulk of voters
process political messages through the central (or rational) mode. In fact, as indicated
above, the majority of people consume political messages and information with a very
modest  degree  of  rational  engagement.  They  tend  to  be  “unfamiliar  with  ideological
constructs; often unable to define or explain them; and anyway not much interested to make use of
them.” 68 Politics is at most a side-show in the drama of their lives, a poor competitor with
more pressing and rewarding pursuits. They do not attend closely to what is happening,
do  not  utilise reliable  sources  of  information,  do  not  engage  in  prolonged cognitive
activity, find handling abstract concepts time-consuming and often rely on affect-driven
heuristics in making judgments. In their survey of focus group findings, Mattinson and
Tyndall  concluded that “many voters  do not  understand how politics  works.  Some find the
constant change, impenetrable language and many layers of political structures complicated and
confusing. …. voters find it hard to understand the issues, hard to relate to the politicians, and hard
to trust the process.” 69 
42 In short, the larger portion of the electorate relies heavily on the “peripheral route” to
ingesting political information. In this process negative or positive cues – e.g. politicians’
appearance,  facial  expressions,  general  demeanour  and  likeability  –  are  of  crucial
importance. For these dwellers in Plato’s cave it is “the shadows of the images” than matter
most. All this is neatly illustrated by the much publicised incident of what the Sun called
Miliband’s  “bacon sandwich disaster  photo.”  70 In May 2014 Miliband was photographed
munching a bacon sandwich. This rapidly evolved into a major news item (with hundreds
of thousands of views on YouTube). For the Mail, the “pictures of him clumsily scoffing a
bacon-and-ketchup sandwich” was “a desperate attempt to [make him] look like a man of  the
people” – but instead demonstrated that he was an unelectable “Mr Weirdo.” 71 Such a man
was plainly utterly unsuited for the premiership. Other newspapers, the broadcasters and
the social media, followed suit to such a degree that Miliband’s and the bacon sandwich
entered  into  popular  folklore.  It  appeared to  operate  as  an  effective  persuasion cue
consolidating a highly negative image of Miliband 
 
Labour’s narrative failure
43 If the way in which people absorb information is a function of their schemas or cognitive
maps what role, then, can a party’s communications strategy have? The first point to
stress is  that is  that whilst  opinion-formation is  an individual  act it  takes place in a
collective process and in a social context. People, in responding to events and making
judgments  draw  heavily  upon  the  wider  world  of  debate,  argument  and  political
advocacy.72 In other words, “how we think and what we think is rooted in the particular
set of meaning-saturated signs and symbols we inherit in a given political setting.” 73
44 This leads to a second point. Public opinion is not fixed and immutable. Rather “people are
active, thinking and feeling agents whose perceptions and understandings of the world...are always
subject to change as a consequence of how they experience a world that is itself subject to change.” 
74 Opinions  are  often  in  a  process  of  flux  as  people’s  schemas  interact  with  their
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experiences and observations of the social world which are, in turn, filtered through the
mass media. This brings us to the third, fundamental, point. Reality is not simply a given
set of facts containing their own, intrinsic meaning: it is the outcome of a process of
construction. 75 Because the meanings of issues, problems and events are not self-evident,
how make sense of them is primarily a function of the interpretive framework people use.
These frameworks have been labelled “narratives”. 76 
45 A narrative has been defined as “a fundamental way in which we grasp the meaning and the
ordering of the events we experience and in particular of how we understand human actions and
their  effects.”  77 Narratives  supply  the  mental  maps  which  confer  some  sort  of
intelligibility on the raw data of events and experiences.78 Since the process of narration
is  an  inherently  social  one  79 political  parties  can  make  strategic  interventions:  by
highlighting  issues  for  debate,  delineating  problems,  invoking  values  and  proposing
policy solutions they contribute to the gradual unfolding of the public conversation. 80 
Crucial  to  the  success  of  a  party’s  persuasive  strategy  is  its  ability  to  mobilise  mass
content for its favoured narrative. 81 This involves framing.
46 As  noted  above,  framing  occurs  where  particular  aspects  of  reality  are  chosen  and
magnified with the intention of eliciting support for a preferred understanding of societal
ills and a preferred set of recipes.82 It entails distilling from an otherwise “overwhelmingly
complex reality” a particular narrative or story-line to enable the essential features of a
problem  to  be  readily  grasped.83 “ Research  suggests”  an  influential  psychologist
commented,  “that  our  minds  naturally  seek  out  stories  with a  particular  kind of  structure,
something that is coherent,  has an initial  setting,  protagonists,  a problem that constitutes the
central story line, obstacles that stand in the way, a sense of who the main protagonists are, and
some form of resolution.”84
47 The Conservatives,  as we show, understood the importance of  narratives but Labour,
crucially, failed to do so. The central hypothesis of this rest of this article is that this
failure had a fatally disabling impact of the party’s strategy gravely impairing its capacity
to intervene effectively in the national debate. The point is illustrated by a case study of
Labour’s feeble, listless and ineffective economic campaign. 
48 As  we  have  seen,  valence  theory  stipulates  economic  credibility  as  one  of  the  key
heuristics determining partisan choice, and on this criterion the Conservatives outshone
Labour by a handsome margin. Some might argue that this simply reflected objective
circumstances from 2013 onwards, with rapidly falling unemployment, revived growth
and price stability. This certainly gave some credence to Tory claims. On the other hand,
the period 2010-2015 was one of  stagnant  and for  many falling living standards and
growing economic insecurity. The post-recession recovery has been the most sluggish on
record, productivity had hardly risen and was lagging well behind comparable countries
and  the  UK  was  running  a  very  high  balance  of  payments  deficit.  85 One  survey  of
prominent macroeconomists found that two thirds of respondents disagreed with the
proposition that Coalition policies had had a positive effect, whilst only 15% agreed.86
Oxford University economics Professor Simon Wren-Lewis concluded, the Conservatives
had  “presided  over  the  worst  recovery  from  a  recession  for  hundreds  of  years,  and  an
unprecedented fall in real wages.”87
49 If Tory economic success was not self-evident why then did people judge it favourably?
Economic issues are incredibly complex and research has found that most voters are
unfamiliar  with  economic  concepts  and  experience  difficulty  in  making  sense  of
economic data.88 Why then did voters consistently rate Labour as much less capable of
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running the economy than the Conservatives? Two considerations seem to have been
particularly influential:
 
Attributions of responsibility for the financial crisis
50 A crucial aspect of a frame is the cognitive mechanism of “responsibility attribution”. The
process of stipulating who is responsible for a particular problem “reduces information and
decision costs and provides a ready basis for political judgment.”89 The Conservatives (and
LibDems)  were  quick  to  recognise  this.  The  economic  narrative  propounded  by  the
Coalition to depict the economic crisis was simple, cogent and straightforward with the
adept use of easily-digested and vivid images and pithy, punchy soundbites all of which
were endlessly  repeated.  It  was  “all  Labour’s  mess”.  The financial  crash occurred had
occurred on its  watch.  Labour  had brought  the  economy to  the  edge  of  bankruptcy
through extravagant over-spending and piling-up debt. It had “maxed out on Britain’s credit
card” and failed to “mend the roof when the sun was shining.” It had squandered money on
the lazy and the pampered at the expense of “hard-working families”, splashing out great
sums on a sprawling and swollen welfare system. It had disregarded the obvious fact that
you had to balance the books and “you can’t spend what you don’t have”. These linguistic
formulations resonated in part because they were reiterated and reinforced by most of
the organs of mass opinion, in part because they gelled with “common sense.” “Common
sense”, Hall and O’Shea argued, “is a compendium of well-tried knowledge, customary beliefs,
wise sayings, popular nostrums and prejudices”, rather like sedimented deposits which have
been  layered  over  the  years  and  thereby  gained  a  solid  grasp  on  the  public  mind,
acquiring the status of “the plainly obvious”.90 Anything that lies outside the preferred
range of meanings was plainly wrong, even outlandish.
51 This was dramatically demonstrated when Miliband appeared before an audience of the
popular news-programme, Question Time to field questions from the audience. He faced a
series  of  angry  questioners  interrogating  him over  his  party’s  responsibility  for  the
recession. When he bluntly denied that “Labour had caused the crisis” much of the Question
Time audience exploded in a paroxysm of disbelieving rage. How could you have trust in
someone who denied irrefutable fact? As a senior Labour MP, Alan Johnson, put it, “when
that Question Time audience turned on Ed Miliband, the die was cast. The public became convinced
that Labour had indeed driven the car into the ditch and declined to return the keys.”91
52 As Johnson added, “We seemed to have no effective riposte to Cameron’s successful distortion of
our economic record in government.”92 Labour’s efforts to develop a rival economic narrative
were halting, hesitant and half-hearted. Vital to effective framing is the ability to forge
connections and weave together ideas in such a way as create “a coherent interpretation on
the whirls of events and actions around us.” 93 But such framing was almost totally neglected
by Labour. Instead it preferred bland, dull and banal soundbites and catchphrases like the
“the cost-of-living crisis”, “the squeezed middle” and “a recovery made by the many and built to
last.”  Given the  party’s  heavy  reliance  on the  broadcasting  media  to  disseminate  its
message, it was especially damaging that,  time and again, it used its access to scarce
broadcasting  time  for  point-scoring,  denunciations  of  ministerial  incompetence  and
cavils over policy details – the whole paraphernalia of knockabout politics which so bored
and alienated voters. The opportunity for narrative-building went by default. 
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53 For the party’s right after the election, Miliband and Balls’ failure was not their inability
to  formulate a  rival  economic  narrative  but  their  reluctance  to  acknowledge  the
established one. By stubbornly refusing to apologise for Labour’s past fiscal improvidence
they forfeited the voters’ trust.94 The problem with this analysis was that, quite simply, it
involved giving credence to a myth. Whilst the UK’s public finances “were not particularly
strong compared with those of other advanced economies”, the prestigious Institute for Fiscal
Studies maintained, equally they “were not in a bad state on the eve of the crisis”.95 The cause
of the crash was, the Treasury’s top official, Sir Nicholas Macpherson declared, “a banking
crisis pure and simple”, a view echoed by Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England at
the  time.96 “The  last  government”,  Wren-Lewis  averred,  “did  not  borrow excessively…The
recession was a consequence of overleveraged banks and the collapse of the US housing markets.”97 
The proposition that  Labour’s  fiscal  stance caused the crisis  of  2008-2009 was,  Nobel
Laureate economist Paul Krugman tartly put it, “nonsensical.”98 
54 Labour’s huge mistake was not its unwillingness to “own-up” but its failure to contest the
Tory narrative.  As Lord Skidelsky (Keynes’  biographer)  observed,  it  left  “the telling of
Labour’s story to the Conservatives.” As a result “the Conservatives have been able to take
the  narrative  of  the  crisis  away  from  Labour  and  turn  their  disastrous  economic
stewardship  to  political  advantage.”99 Krugman  was  “ astonished”  by  the  limpness  of
Labour’s response to “the austerity push” and by its willingness “to accept claims that budget
deficits are the biggest economic issue facing the nation.”100 The leading economic journalist,
William Keegan, put the matter pithily:  “Labour was ineffective in countering the Big Lie
….that Gordon brown was responsible for the recession.”101 It was, Krugman concluded, guilty
of “an absolutely terrible job of making its case.”102 
55 The  contest  for  narrative  ascendance  is  of crucial  importance  since  most  politically
inattentive voters – the dwellers in Plato’s Cave – are, social psychological theory holds, “
cognitive misers” who in making judgments will rely heavily on what ideas are most easily
accessible. If only one interpretation of a problem is readily available then it is highly
likely to be the only one noticed, understood and accepted.103 The Tories offered a well-
crafted narrative which was relentlessly hammered home. Labour responded with, in the
words of Nobel prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz, “a minimalist agenda that was out
of sync with the magnitude of the problems.”104 The Tory narrative monopolised the field and
set the terms through which all subsequent debate was conducted.105 “The initial view of a
social crisis caused by out-of-control capitalism”, Andrew Marr wrote, was replaced by the
belief  that  it  was a  bloated,  out-of-control  state that  was largely to blame.  That  has
probably been the single most important political fact of the past five years.”106
 
Judging economic competence
56 For a narrative to gain ascendancy, it has to “win a kind of credibility, legitimacy or taken-for-
grantedness for itself”, which in turn involves “marginalizing, down-grading or de-legitimating
alternative constructions.”107 Here the media play an essential role since voters are reliant
on  them  for  relaying  and  distilling  complex  information  about  the  economy.  They
operate as communication gatekeepers “controlling what messages reach the public...through
their control over the organisational channels of communication.”108
57 Labour’s problem here was that it inhabited a media environment in which most news
organisations  (including  the  broadcasters)  were  largely  content  to  recycle  received
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economic  orthodoxy about  the  debt,  the  deficit,  welfare  spending and the  purgative
powers of austerity. The antipathy of most of the newspapers was predictable, given that
right-wing newspapers commanded not far short of 90% of total readership. But Labour’s
difficulty was compounded by the fact that most TV journalists and producers bought
into  the  ruling  austerity  narrative.  In  broadcast  interview after  broadcast  interview
during the election campaign, Labour spokespeople were relentlessly interrogated about
how precisely they could eliminate the deficit as if  this was self-evidently the test of
economic probity  and  good-sense.  Krugman  noted  the  striking  contrast  in  the  UK
between “the consensus of professional economists” and “what passes for economic analysis in
the news media — even in high-end newspapers and on elite-oriented TV shows.” At a time when
the austerity paradigm had been discredited amongst most macroeconomics “to the point
where hardly anyone still believes it” it was still uncritically accepted and regurgitated by
the bulk of the UK media.109 
58 A key role in shaping economic debate is also played by those who acquire the status as
disinterested experts.110 In analysing those who appear on the media, Deacon and Golding
distinguish between advocates, who are “associated with a particular position” and arbiters,
who are “regarded as  non-aligned providers  of  information.”  The views of  the latter “are
treated with much greater deference.”111 The media (especially the broadcasters) regularly
employ  business  representatives,  especially  from the  City,  as  authoritative  economic
arbiters, seen as uniquely suited by virtue of their occupational location and specialist
knowledge to pronounce on the health of the economy and on the feasibility of party
policies.112 One study of the interpretations of the financial crisis found that City voices
figured disproportionately in BBC programmes and they were treated “as impartial experts
rather than as representatives of a sectional interest.”113 This follows a common and recurring
pattern. In Stuart Hall’s terminology, these voices were “the accredited witnesses [….] who
had a privileged access, as of right, to the world of public discourse and whose statements carried
the representativeness and authority which permitted them to establish the primary framework or
terms of an argument.”114 
59 This posed a major problem for Labour. In angering business the party was incurring the
enmity not only of a powerful bloc which wielded very considerable structural power but
also of one which acted as an agent of legitimation, whose representatives – as “accredited
witnesses” – were able to set the terms of the economic debate. The business community
was particularly aggravated by the prospect  of  having to pay a higher rate (50%) of
income tax115 which former Labour City minister, the financier Lord Myners, dubbed “
predatory  taxation”  and “the  politics  of  envy.”116 During the election campaign,  a  letter
signed by 103 senior business leaders (including a number who had backed New Labour)
warned that a “change in course” would “put the recovery at risk” and would “threaten jobs
and  deter  investment.”117 This  received  very  extensive  and mainly  uncritical  extensive
media coverage – far fuller than the survey of macroeconomists mentioned above that
appeared on the same day118 – and was treated as informed and impartial commentary.
The perception that Labour would be “bad for business” and, therefore, “bad for the British
economy”, framed much of the debate on economic issues in broadcasting as well as most
of the press. 
60 To Blairite critics after the election, Miliband had “allowed the impression to arise that we
were not on the side of  those who are doing well” and “creating wealth”119 and, except for
Jeremy Corby, the contenders to replace him as leader all admonished him for heedlessly
offending business.120 Andy Burnham (ostensibly a non-Blairite) called for an admission
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that Labour “got it  wrong on business” and promised that under his leadership Labour
would “celebrate the spirit of enterprise”, praise “the everyday [business] heroes of our society”
and “champion wealth creation.”121 Former shadow chancellor Ed Balls after the election
criticised what he dubbed as Miliband’s “anti-business” stance adding that it “was no secret
that I thought from the very beginning that Ed needed to position himself better with business.”122
61 In  fact  it  can  be  argued  that  “anti-business”  Labour  had  exhibited  a  circumspection
verging on timidity towards business.123 Over the years business organisations, especially
in  the  financial  sector,  had  been  found  to  be  responsible  for  endemic  malpractices
including a  long series  of  mis-selling scandals,  over  mortgage endowments,  personal
pensions, Personal Protection Insurance (PPI),  card protection insurance and interest-
rate swaps; and major cases of rigging of interest rate (Libor) and exchange rate (Forex)
markets, both of which had cost the banks and insurance companies billions of pounds in
compensation and fines. To this can be added the countless billions lost to government
revenues  through rampant  and massive  tax  evasion and avoidance,  hugely  dwarfing
much-publicised welfare fraud.124 
62 Most damaging of  all  was the deep involvement of  British banks and other financial
institutions in the speculation-driven financial crash. None of the above issues (with the
partial exception of tax avoidance) figured prominently in Labour’s campaigning and the
occasional  criticism  of  business  tended  to  be  tentative,  hesitant  and  very  carefully
modulated. For example, there was no systematic analysis of industry’s poor record in
productivity,  investment  and  employee  training  largely  responsible  for  the  weak
performance of UK manufacturing. 
63 But in the eyes the right of the party it appeared the behaviour of the financial and
corporate sector should be more or less exempt from critical invigilation, certainly on
any sustained and rigorous manner.  Lord Mandelson, a senior minister in the Brown
government,  averred  that  Labour  would  never  be  seen  to  be  economically  credible
without demonstrating that it “understood business.” 125 In effect, what was good for British
business was good for the nation as a whole. Some time ago, Crouch pointed out that New
Labour was “moving beyond the rapprochement and co-operation with business interests which is
essential to all social democratic parties to becoming simply a business party.” 126 That movement
stalled under Miliband: whether it should resume, as the party’s right urged, became a
matter of some contention in the leadership race, and the outlook remains unclear. 
 
Conclusion
64 None of Labour’s four predicaments was resolved and any prospect of victory slid away.
Crucial to effective campaigning is the capacity “to define the party and its principles in a way
that is emotionally compelling and tells a coherent story of what its members believe in.”127 Far
from narrating such a story, the party was obsessed with short-term presentation, with
grabbing favourable headlines through often disconnected policy initiatives and with
wrong-footing  the  government  in  tactical  manoeuvres  that  often  left  voters  bored,
exasperated and baffled. Initially some tentative efforts were made to play with larger
themes, such as the flirtation with “Blue Labour” and “predatory versus responsible capitalism
” but these soon vanished from Labour’s lexicon. The party then played with the idea of “
One Nation Labour”, drawing upon some Blue Labour ideas and formulating an approach
that could appeal to both the poor and the “squeezed middle.” But the concept lacked
clarity, precision and resonance, and the leadership was never fully committed. In 2013
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the “omnishambles” budget which witnessed a slump in the Coalition’s popularity opened
a  gap  between  the  two  main  parties,  convincing  the  inner  leadership  that  in  could
dispense with broader themes and rely instead on what Cruddas called a “minimalist,
safety-first  offer.”128 The “offer” consisted of  a list  of  focus-group tested policy -  but
essentially un-coordinated - “winners” such as an energy price freeze, a 10% income tax
band, a higher minimum wage and above all pledges for more nurses and doctors for the
NHS. For the last two years of the 2010 Parliament Labour’s strategy was essentially two-
pronged: a combination of advocacy of these policy “winners” and effort to undermine
and discredit the Coalition’s record. 
65 But  even  here  Labour’s  message  too  often  was  communicated  in  a  hesitant  and
ambivalent manner, lacking confidence, clarity and consistency. The party denounced the
heartlessness of coalition cuts, whilst conceding it would be unable to reverse them. It
accepted some measures (caps on benefits) whilst rejecting others (the bedroom tax). It
gravitated towards more stringent fiscal targets but appeared chary about specifying how
they would be met. Above all, it was reluctant, to contest the right’s terms of engagement,
“hiding its own good actions behind tough talk”, its “foggy messages hiding agonised ambivalence
.”129 
66 The most effective way in which politicians “can manipulate the issue positions of voters [is]
by manipulating the interpretations to which voters are exposed.”130 Labour’s faltering efforts
here meant that too often voters were only exposed to one interpretation, that of the
right. It had no rejoinder to the proponents of austerity and its response to the anti-
welfare assault was often almost contrite and apologetic. As Stuart Hall and his colleagues
presciently observed in 2013, “Labour is not yet winning hearts and minds. It shuttles between
conflicting ways forward. ….. [and] appears tongue-tied when invited to enunciate an alternative
set of principles, to outline a strategic political approach or to sketch out a compelling alternative
vision.”131 
67 For many within the party Labour was crushed because it had lost touch with reality. “Not
since 1983” frontbencher Tristram Hunt announced, “have we been so out of step with the
prevailing mood of the nation.”132 As we have seen, on the crucial issues of the economy,
immigration and welfare  benefits,  there  was  much truth in  this  claim.  But  here  lay
Labour’s  ultimate predicament.  Any party to gain office must  take account of  public
opinion – but to what extent? What if that opinion sat uneasily not only with the party’s
own values,  ethos and tradition but with empirically verifiable reality? As the above
account  has  shown,  mass  attitudes  on  contentious  issues  were  often  permeated  by
misconceptions, misinformation - or even plain prejudice. Such attitudes often formed
the stuff of the “reality”, which, as Hunt and others contended, Labour had ignored. All “
realities”,  it  could be admitted,  are to some degree contrived but some more so than
others. Labour’s final, perhaps debilitating, weakness was the inability or unwillingness of
most of its leading figures to even confront this problem: to what extent should the party
adjust its policies to reflect or seek to reshape popular opinion where that opinion does
not form the basis for rational, effective and progressive policies? 
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ABSTRACTS
This  article  discusses  why  the  Labour  party  was  highly  unlikely  to  win  the  British  general
election of 2015. It does so by probing four major predicaments: lack of confidence in Ed Miliband
as a potential Prime Minister, in Labour’s ability to run the economy, in its capacity to manage
the explosive issue of immigration and in its will to tackle (alleged) pervasive welfare abuse. The
article agrees that, in the key issues of the economy, immigration and social welfare Labour was
quite out of tune with public perceptions and attitudes but then suggests these many of these
were,  in  turn,  at  variance  with  empirically  verifiable  facts.  The  article  then  contends  that
political  parties do have the capacity to modify public perceptions and attitudes but only be
devising plausible alternative narratives. This the Labour party signally failed to do, disabling its
capacity to resolve any of its four predicaments. 
Cet article montre pourquoi une victoire travailliste aux élections législatives de 2015 était peu
probable,  en analysant  quatre  obstacles  principaux : le  manque de confiance en Ed Miliband
comme premier ministre potentiel, en la capacité des travaillistes à gérer l’économie, en leur
capacité  à  se  saisir  de  l’enjeux potentiel  explosif  de  l’immigration,  et  en sa  détermination à
s’attaquer à la fraude aux allocations sociales, supposément très répandue. Cet article accepte
l’idée selon laquelle, sur l’économie, l’immigration et l’Etat-providence, le parti travailliste était
en décalage avec les perceptions et  les attitudes dominantes dans l’opinion publique,  mais il
suggère aussi  que ces perceptions et  attitudes étaient elles-mêmes en décalage avec les  faits
vérifiables  empiriquement.  L’article  avance  ensuite  que  les  partis  politiques  ont  la  capacité
d’influer  sur  les  perceptions  et  les  attitudes,  mais  seulement  en  construisant  des  discours
alternatifs plausibles. C’est ce en quoi le parti travailliste a échoué de manière spectaculaire, se
privant ainsi des moyens de surmonter ses quatre obstacles. 
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